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Abstract
The fact that physical laws often admit certain kinds of space-time symmetries is of-
ten thought to be problematic for substantivalism — the view that space-time is as real
as the objects it contains. The most prominent alternative, relationism, avoids these
problems but at the cost of giving abstract objects (rather than space-time points) a
pivotal role in the fundamental metaphysics. This incurs related problems concerning
the relation of the physical to the mathematical. In this paper I will present a version
of substantivalism that respects Leibnizian theses about space-time symmetries, and
argue that it is superior to both relationism and the more orthodox form of substanti-
valism.
Substantivalism is the view that locations exist independently of the objects that they are
locations of. Thus, for example, the moon’s present location would have existed even if it
had not been located there and, reciprocally, there are regions that could have been the
location of some material object, but aren’t (unoccupied regions).
Substantivalism can have a number of different motivations. In ordinary English we
frequently talk about, and quantify over, locations. For example, I can talk about where
Emily went on vacation, or where I left my keys; I can in some cases talk about unoccupied
locations, such as the place I would have been had I traveled halfway to the moon. The
substantivalist has a ready answer for what we are doing when we quantify in this way: we
are quantifying over regions of space-time. If this were the central motivation, however, it
would suggest that the dispute is primarily about the existence of locations. This is not
quite right: even those who oppose substantivalism — the relationists — are often happy
to accept ordinary talk about locations provided that that talk can be recovered from a
more acceptable fundamental ontology. (For these theorists, locations are a bit like shadows
and holes: they are, metaphysically speaking, ‘second-rate’ entities in some sense. We can
readily quantify over them, but their existence depends on other kinds of things: a location
on the thing that occupies it1, much like a shadow on the thing that casts it, and a hole on
the thing it penetrates.)
Substantivalists arguably should not accept this reduction of our ordinary talk of lo-
cations to quantification over regions of space-time either. My pocket is not a region of
space-time, and nor is Paris — for example, my pocket changes its shape as it goes through
the washing machine, and a region of space-time cannot change its shape. But my pocket
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1Or perhaps, if the region is empty, the possible objects that could have occupied it. See Forbes [14].
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and Paris are the kinds of things I might be asking about when I ask where my keys are or
when I ask where Emily when on vacation.2
Since I find the above sorts of objections compelling, I shall place little weight in what
follows on the arguments from ordinary language. In my view, the strongest motivations for
substantivalism — the motivations that play a central role in this paper — are slightly more
theoretical. Space-time points tend to appear in the formulation of many of our simplest
physical theories and this gives us good reason to take their existence seriously.
Unfortunately the most straightforward versions of substantivalism and relationism suffer
from having a pair of undesirable, and arguably related, consequences. Substantivalism
predicts the existence of physically indistinguishable worlds that differ solely concerning
where things are located. For according to substantivalism there could be two worlds that
differ from each other only in that each object’s location in one world has been displaced
relative to the other by some fixed distance in some particular direction (see Leibniz [18]).
By refusing to take talk of locations and regions of space-time at face value the rela-
tionist does not face this problem in its most acute form. However relationists are subject
to a somewhat similar concern. The most straightforward versions of relationism take geo-
metrical properties and relations to be a matter of fundamental relations holding between
material objects and abstract objects, such as numbers to represent distances between ob-
jects, vectors to represent forces, and so on. However much like the substantivalist’s location
relation, I shall argue, one can have physically indistinguishable worlds in which the rela-
tions between the material objects and the appropriate abstracta have undergone a similar
kind of displacement.
In this paper I shall in response to these worries be advocating for a novel version of
substantivalism underwritten by a non-standard account of the relation between material
objects and the regions they occupy. As I cautioned against earlier, the theory is not
intended to model our ordinary way of speaking about locations. However the theory does
allow one to give a story about how the shapes of objects, the distances between them, and
other such facts can emerge from the relations they stand in to a sufficiently structured
space-time manifold.
Here is an outline of the paper. In section 1 I review Leibniz’s shift argument against
substantivalism and argue that it provides us with reasons to look for alternatives to the or-
thodox version of substantivalism. In section 2.1 I consider the analogous problem involving
abstracta for (versions of) relationism, and consider the options for a relationist who wishes
to give an account of geometrical properties without reference to abstract objects. To this
effect I outline in section 2.2 a result that says that any first or second-order language that
can express, relative to some class of models, all possible configurations of a system of n
particles either must have an infinite set of fundamental primitives or must admit a model
with an infinite ontology (whether that be an ontology of space-time points, abstract ob-
jects, or something else). In section 3 I develop a substantivalist theory according to which
an object is located at a region of space-time if and only if it is located at every transforma-
tion of that region. Thus unlike orthodox substantivalism, objects are multiply located in
a fairly far-reaching way. Finally, I consider two further technical issues in the appendices:
the treatment of space-time fields and the first-order theory governing the interaction of
parthood and location.
2Of course some people — the supersubstantivalists — do identify my pocket with a region; however
some fairly elaborate maneuvers are needed to make sense of the idea that ordinary things could have had
different shapes.
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1 Leibniz’s shift argument
Substantivalism is subject to an old objection that traces all the way back to Leibniz [18].
Pick some direction and distance, and imagine a world at which the location of every object
has been translated uniformly in that direction by that distance, but in which every other
property of the object has been kept the same. According to the substantivalist, worlds
related by such operations are genuinely different because they disagree about facts con-
cerning which particular regions of space-time each object is located at. Substantivalism
thus falls afoul of the following seemingly attractive thesis:
No Shifts: There are no differences between shifted worlds.
A pair of worlds are ‘shifts’ of one another if they are related by a translation of every object’s
location of the sort described above. The crucial feature of shifts to highlight here is that
they preserve all the laws of physics, and arguably all observable properties and relations
between objects.3 Very similar arguments could be made by appealing to other spatial
transformations operations: rotating about some axis or reflection about some plane. And
just as we can consider spatial transformations, we may also consider operations involving
time: time reversal (a kind of temporal reflection), temporal shifts (moving every event
forwards or backwards a fixed amount of time) and boosts (uniform shifts of velocity), and
of course, arbitrary combinations of any of these operations. We shall call a combination of
these operations a Galilean transformation.4
The principle No Shifts has been given a number of distinct motivations over the
years, some less convincing than others. While some have overtly theistic or verificationist
premises, No Shifts has remained central to the debate about the existence of space-time,
even though attempts to motivate it from more general principles have changed. Most
contemporary philosophers take the best justification for No Shifts to be a defeasible one:
theories that postulate undetectable structure that play no role in explaining the observable
world are not to be preferred over theories that do not postulate this structure but are
otherwise just as simple and explanatory (see, for example, Russell [25], Pooley [24]) As a
silly example, one could imagine a theory which postulates the existence of an absolute origin
from which every point can be a assigned an absolute distance. Although a particular origin
could well make a nominal appearance when the dynamical laws are formulated in terms of a
particular coordinate system, a world in which an alternative point were the absolute origin
would be identical to our own in all physical respects. This kind of additional structure is
completely undetectable and is also unnecessary to the formulation the dynamical laws. A
less silly example is Newton’s original formulation of classical mechanics, in which there was
a distinguished velocity called ‘absolute rest’: objects traveling at that velocity counted as
being at absolute rest, and objects moving relative to it had absolute motion. The move
3One might object here on the grounds that one can have singular thoughts about particular regions of
space-time, and thus knowledge, that isn’t preserved under transformations. (I can know that I’m located
right here, at this particular region of space-time for example — I clearly wouldn’t know this in a world
where I wasn’t located right here). I’m going to set this issue to one side for the time being, but see Maudlin
[19] for more discussion.
4Note on terminology: sometimes reflections of various sorts are excluded from the definition of a Galilean
transformations — I always intend them to be included in what follows. Under the operation of composi-
tion these transformations form a group called the Galilean group. Note, however, that I do not include
enlargements in the space of transformations: these are not in fact symmetries of the laws of Newtonian
physics, since the rate at which two particles of equal mass will accelerate towards one another depends on
the distance they are separated.
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from Newtonian space-time to Galilean space-time, in which this redundant structure is
eliminated, is now universally accepted.
The main problem for this line of reasoning is that unlike the case of the absolute origin
and absolute rest, we don’t have a clear alternative theory in which the redundant structure
is eliminated. Thus, while many philosophers take this version of Leibniz’s challenge to
be serious one, ultimately reject it on the grounds that the most prominent alternative to
substantivalism — relationism — doesn’t share the theoretical virtues of the substantivalist
theory (see for example Pooley [24] and Maudlin [21] p65-66).5 This strikes me as sufficient
reason to explore alternative theories which don’t posit this sort of redundant invisible
structure.6
2 Relationism
The best argument for No Shifts rests on general considerations of theory choice, and is
thus successful only if there is a simple alternative to the standard version of substantivalism
that respects it. It is often assumed that relationism is this alternative. Unfortunately
relationism faces a somewhat similar set of issues.
2.1 Mathematical Relationism
According to relationism, the motions and geometrical properties of material objects are
not grounded by the relations they stand in to a background space-time manifold. Thus the
relationist is in need of some other kind of theory of these sorts of properties and relations.
To keep things simple we shall restrict our attention to a relatively sparse world consisting
of three point particles, arranged in a certain configuration, traveling with certain momenta
as governed by the laws of Newtonian gravitation. Since it is clear that there is a difference
between worlds in which the particles are arranged in, say, a regular triangular shape, and
those in which they are colinear, or worlds in which the masses of the particles, and thus
the forces between them, are greater or smaller, the relationist owes us an account of what
these differences consist in.
According to the most straightforward versions of relationism, geometrical properties
like these consist in fundamental relations holding, in certain configurations, between the
material objects, numbers and other kinds of abstract objects. Thus, for example, distances
can be represented by a fundamental three place relation, Dxyz, taking two particles and
a real number, satisfying the axioms of a metric space. (In mathematical contexts, it is
standard to equivalently describe such a relation as a function d(x, y) mapping x and y to
the distance between them.) Thus three particles arranged in a regular triangle are such
that each pair of them is related to the same number. The gravitational force exerted by one
particle on another can similarly be represented by a relation, Fxyz, taking two particles
and a vector from some suitable normed three-dimensional vector space, and mass can be
5Although there have been several attempts to develop a ‘Machian’ theory of this sort, it’s unclear how
successful they are. See Barbour and Bertotti [4] and Barbour and Bertotti [5]. See Pooley [24] for an
overview.
6This general sort of project has been attempted by Dasgupta ([8], [REF]) and Russell [25], but both
sorts of theories involve contentious metaphysical ideology such as a many-many grounding relation or a
primitive factuality operator. The approach I will be recommending here is straightforwardly intelligible to
anyone who has the concepts presupposed in the original relationism/substantivalism debate — specifically,
anyone willing to theorize in terms of the location relation.
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represented by a binary relation between particles and real numbers Mxy (equivalently a
function f(x, y) mapping pairs of particles to vectors and a function m(x) mapping particles
to real numbers).7 Given this kind of background theory, one can begin to attempt to re-
construct a relationistically acceptable version of Newtonian physics: for example, we might
subject F the restriction that if F holds between x, y and v it holds between y, x and −v
according to Newton’s third law.8 Although there is room for much variation in the details
let us call this general kind of approach, in which geometric and physical properties are
grounded in relations between the physical and the platonic realms, mathematical relation-
ism. (For a prominent theory of this sort, which freely employs relations to mathematical
objects, see Barbour and Bertotti [5]).
The framework just outlined seems to be susceptible to an objection similar to the one
aﬄicting substantivalism: it seems that one can describe two different configurations of these
relations between objects and numbers that correspond to the same physical scenario. For
consider any legal arrangement of our three particle system: this will consist in the relations
D,F and M holding between our particles, numbers, and vectors in some configuration.
In particular, each pair of particles, x and y, will be related by F to some vector v in an
abstract vector space V , representing the force that x exerts on y. Now consider another
configuration which agrees with the original regarding which things are related via M and D,
but in which the vector related to each pair of particles by F has been uniformly switched,
at every time, for the result of rotating that vector by 90 degrees about some fixed axis in
the abstract vector space it belongs to. Notice that this operation will preserve everything
of importance for the modeling of forces — crucially, it will preserve the inner product which
represents the lengths of the vectors and the angles between them.
This operation bears many of the marks of Leibniz’s shift argument: the operation of
rotating the vector that represents the force between any pair of particles appears to be
a symmetry of our relationist theory. Although this is not on its own a sufficient reason
to reject this theory, it does mean it lacks the advertised advantages over substantivalism.
We must, however, be careful to distinguish the symmetry just described from a different
operation. For example, one can imagine a possible world that is not legal by the standards
of the Newtonian theory of gravitation, in which the force that the particle y exerts on x
is not parallel, but orthogonal to the line passing between them — see the ‘Illegal world’
diagram below. (Note: each diagram is supposed to represent three different states all at
the same time t).
Legal world 1 Legal world 2 Illegal world
x
v // y x
u // y
x
u
OO
y
This is not the operation I am describing: if the force y exerts on x really is acting per-
pendicular to the line between them then at later times x would accelerate in a direction
7I have set aside the issue of time here. A proper treatment may involve introducing another argument
place to these predicates for a time, or giving them a tense-logical treatment (the latter seems natural for
those relationists, such as Arthur Prior, who reject time as well as space).
8One might wonder in one could eliminate forces just by appealing to distances and masses (or perhaps
masses in favour of distances and forces). This is far from clear: for example a pair of equally massive
particles orbiting one another in a circular motion will have constant masses, and be at a constant distance
from one another, although the force acting between them is constantly changing, so that forces can’t be
recovered from mass and distance alone.
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perpendicular to that line, so that the distance between x and y ought to increase for a
period of time (absent other forces).9 In the original example, however, I stipulated that
the distance facts are the same at both possibilities at all times, so if the original case is
legal, the distance between x and y will decrease for a period in the variant world. The
‘shifted’ world is therefore a world in which the physical force in fact points from x to y
(since that is the direction that x will move in), but in which its so pointing consists in x
and y standing, via F , to a different abstract vector (u instead of v, as in ‘Legal world 1’
and ‘Legal world 2’).
Of course, one could insist that one of these configurations is not really a metaphysical
possibility. Perhaps, in that configuration, only v but not u could possibly represent the
force exerted by y on x. Similar moves can also be made in the substantival case: perhaps no
two worlds that agree about the non-locational profile of the material objects can disagree
about their locations in space-time. But such responses do little to assuage the feeling of
arbitrariness — why, for example, is it necessary that when the particles are arranged this
particular way, they are always located at this region of space-time.
Note also that the vector representing the force y exerts on x can differ between times,
even when those times agree about the mass and distance facts. For consider a system of
two equally massive point particles, x and y, orbiting one another in a circular motion. The
distance between the particles, and their masses remain fixed over time. However the vector
representing the force between x and y is rotating at a constant rate.10 Thus, in fact, the
states depicted in ‘Legal world 1’ and ‘Legal world 2’ could represent the state of the same
world at two different times. So the thought that it’s impossible for v or impossible for u
to represent the force acting between x and y when the distance and mass facts are in such
a state seems to rule out certain kinds of physically possible scenarios.11
It may strike the reader that the above problem is specific to the particular form of
mathematical relationism I have outlined above, which relied on the use of vectors. However
the problem outlined above is but an instance of a more general problem for relationism
outlined by Hartry Field in [11]. For example, Field notes that we can describe the world
equally well using different units (see Field [11]). Thus a configuration of M , D and F in
which M relates each particle to its mass in kilograms, and the configuration in which M
relates each particle to its mass in pounds but is otherwise the same, correspond to the same
physical scenario. The ‘shift’ that we are performing in this case is that of multiplication by
a factor of a scalar quantity, rather than a rotation of a vector quantity.12 There is something
9We are assuming here that the world is legal in at least the sense that particles accelerate in the direction
of the forces acting on them, even though it is illegal in the sense that the force exerted by a particle does
not point towards the particle.
10This is part of the reason why this version of relationism can avoid Newton’s bucket.
11One could try to make this argument more rigorous by appeal to the principle that whatever sometimes
happens could happen (see Dorr and Goodman [9]), for in the two particle world described, x and y sometimes
bear F to v and sometimes to u, but always bear M and D to fixed numbers. (Although I do not myself
subscribe to this principle, there is something very compelling about the intuition in this case.)
12In the case of scale dependence there’s a fairly straightforward fix: instead of having a primitive binary
relation Mxy relating each object to a number, have a ternary relation Mxyz relating two physical objects
to a number that simply tells us what the ratio of the mass of x and y is. Whatever units we choose, the
ratio of two masses will remain the same. However this doesn’t really speak to the underlying problem that
when abstract numbers appear in physics there are usually other abstract objects that would do the job just
as well; usually the choice of mathematical objects to use is made based on convenience. A slightly contrived
version of this problem applies even to ratios of physical quantities — there are many abstract objects that
could do the job of ratios equally well. Ratios are real numbers, and set theoretically we can construct these
entities in several equally natural ways: we can represent them by certain sets of rational numbers, called
Dedekind cuts, or by certain kinds of converging sequences of rational numbers called Cauchy sequences.
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very suspect about a fundamental metaphysics in which one has to choose between kilograms
and pounds, quite aside from its the fact that it generates invisible distinctions.
The issue to do with units above appears to be part of a broader set of problems af-
flicting theories that postulate relations to mathematical objects in order to account for
the fundamental properties of physical objects. In general there is a lot of arbitrariness in
our choices when we represent the world using abstracta: not just in the choice of units,
but sometimes in more far reaching ways. For example, Newtonian mechanics is simple
enough to be formulated in terms of affine spaces — in which pairs of space-time points
are related to objects in a mathematical vector space — but it could also be formulated in
the language of differential geometry in which case each space-time point is instead related
to an equivalence class of real-valued smooth functions on a neighborhood of that point.
Similar points extend to most uses of abstracta by physicists, whether it concerns the choice
of origin and orientation of a coordinate system, the choice of units, or sometimes the very
choice of mathematical formalism itself.13
Thus some philosophers, such as Field, have maintained on this basis that ‘relations
between physical things and numbers are conventional relations that are derivative from
more basic relations that hold among physical things alone’. Field has in mind relations
of magnitude in particular and, although he is presumably at least partly being motivated
by his nominalism, also mentions considerations such those about units mentioned above.
I am not a nominalist, but I think the idea is compelling nonetheless. Even if one rejects
nominalism, it would be puzzling if the fundamental laws of motion, for example, depended
for their truth on the existence of abstract objects. One could dramatize this intuition by
imagining that all numbers were to disappear tomorrow: insofar as we can entertain such
a hypothesis, it doesn’t seem likely that there would be any serious consequences for the
non-mathematical universe — it’s not like the earth would stop orbiting the sun, or that
planes would start falling out of the sky. Gravity, for example, seems to be a physical force
whose existence does not depend on the numbers we use to represent it: surely concrete
things could have moved about in the way that physics demands even if there hadn’t been
any numbers.
2.2 The prospects for alternative versions of relationism
It is best, I think, for a relationist to maintain that material objects have their topological,
metrical and geometrical structure intrinsically : structure that is internal to the domain of
material objects and is not merely inherited by their relation to a platonic realm of numbers.
There are a couple of ways we could go about this project, depending on whether we take
there to be an infinite number of metaphysically primitive geometrical properties or a finite
number:
1. Geometric Primitivism: Take each geometrical property and relation to be meta-
physically primitive. On this picture all geometrical properties are equally fundamen-
tal.
This theory will have an infinite number of primitives: for each possible value of α
there is a primitive relation between particles of being α meters apart, for each possible
Even if real numbers are sui generis entities, and are not identical to either of these constructions out of
rational numbers, that just means that we have one more isomorphic mathematical structure to choose
between.
13For example, some physicists prefer to theorize in the language of category theory, which often leads to
certain kinds of more familiar abstracta being replaced with categories.
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shape, there is a primitive fundamental property of having that shape, and so on.
2. Geometric Reductionism: Attempt to fix the geometrical structure by a smaller
finite set of primitives.
Perhaps to the notion of an object being an open sphere (Tarski [30]), or to the notion
of two pairs of particles being congruent to another, and one being between the other
(Hilbert [15], Tarski [29]).14
If one thought that our fundamental properties and relations are governed by simple laws,
the first option should strike us a deeply unsatisfactory. There are, for example, general
geometrical laws relating collections of particles with certain shapes, and moreover physical
laws governing how those shapes should evolve as the particles are attracted to and repel
one another. In the first kind of theory we have no hope of writing these sorts of laws
down: to achieve quantification over distances (which we need to do in order to talk about
rates of change, for example) would require one to employ large infinitary conjunctions and
disjunctions.15
The latter sort of approach to geometry has been developed extensively by Hilbert and
Tarski, and has most prominently been championed in the philosophical literature by Field
[11] (see also Arntzenius and Dorr [3], Casati and Varzi [7], Maudlin[20], for some similar
approaches to geometrical and related structure). To illustrate let us focus on the work of
Hilbert [15] and Tarski [29]. The usual way to represent distances between points would be
to introduce a metric — a function from pairs of space-time points to real numbers — telling
us how far apart the points are. The mark of the Hilbert-Tarski program, by contrast, is
that it employs a small number of geometrical properties and relations whose relata are
concreta. These geometrical properties can be understood in both a substantivalist or a
relationist setting by interpreting the primitives as applying to either regions of space-time
or material objects respectively. In Tarski’s geometry of solids, for example, we have the
following primitives:
1. A binary relation x ≤ y whose intended interpretation says that x is a mereological
part of y.
2. A unary predicate, Sx, stating that x is an open sphere.16
Hilbert’s axiomatisation, also later refined by Tarski, instead only invokes a pair of relations
whose arguments are point-like objects:
1. A three place betweenness relation, Bxyz, whose intended interpretation states that
x lies on the straight line segment between y and z.
2. A four place spatial congruence relation, Cxyzw, whose intended interpretation states
that the distance between x and y is the same as that between z and w. (For short:
xy is congruent to zw.)
14If we are interested in properties relating to the smoothness of the manifold the notion of a converging
sequence of points (Dorr and Arntzenius [3]), or topological properties the notion of two things touching
(Casati and Varzi [7]) or a closed line (Maudlin [20]).
15For a comprehensive discussion of related issues see Skow [28]; see also the further discussion in Klein-
schmidt [17].
16This is what modern mathematicians would call an open ball ; the word ‘sphere’ is now typically reserved
for the two dimensional surface of a ball, however this is not what Tarski meant by a sphere.
8
It should be noted that in this setting the quantifiers are understood as ranging over point-
like objects (space-time points or point-like material objects); if one wanted to make that
restriction explicit one could introduce another primitive applying to mereological atoms,
or one could simply stipulatively understand congruence so that it applies to no complex
objects and define atomicity as standing in congruence relations to some things.
The general approach is not limited to quantities representing distances either. Field has
shown that the latter sort of theory can be extended to other quantities. If I want to talk
about the numerical value of a field at a given point — for example, the mass density field or
the gravitational potential — I can employ a similar trick. One can introduce a congruence
relation stating that the difference in gravitational potential, for example, at x and y is the
same as the difference of the gravitational potential at z and w, and a betweenness relation
saying the potential at x is between the potential at y and z respectively (see Field [11]).17
One might hope that a relationist could employ small set of geometrical primitives, such
as those above, and attempt to recover geometric structure that way.
Unfortunately, as Hartry Field has noted in [12], some of the above theories are simply
not available to the relationist. In particular the Hilbert-style theory, employing congruence
and betweenness, fix the relevant geometric structure only if there is a sufficiently large
number of geometric objects hanging around. This can be illustrated with a simple example:
consider a situation in which the distance between x and y is two times the distance between
z and w. While this may on the surface look as though we have a relation between four
points and the number two, in the Hilbertian setting reference to the number two can be
eliminated. This relation can be stated instead as follows:
There is some point u between x and y such that both xu and uy are congruent to
zw.
If we wanted to say the distance between x and y was three times the distance between zw
we’d say there was a u1 and u2 such that xu1, u1u2 and u2y were each congruent to zw.
One can see, without much trouble, how to paraphrase away talk of arbitrary rational ratios
of distances in this fashion. Note that once you have pinned down the rational distances
between points all remaining distances between points are fixed. So, given the existence
of enough point-like objects, betweenness and congruence facts are enough to pin down all
metric structure: no two worlds can agree about the betweenness and congruence facts and
disagree about the geometrical facts.
The above statement captures the notion of a pair of particles being twice as far apart
as another pair perfectly well in a substantivalist setting, since according to that theory, for
any two space-time points there is another space-time point between them. However Field
notes that this is not so for point-sized material objects: if I take the closest point to the
earth on the edge of the moon, p, and take the closest point to the moon on the edge of
the earth, q, (suppose for a moment that both have definite boundaries) then, at least by
the relationist’s lights, there are no entities between p and q, not even a space-time point.
Thus, even if I were twice as far away from the earth as the moon is, I wouldn’t count as
such by the lights of Hilbert’s analysis given a relationist ontology. Indeed, it is easy to
see that there are distinct arrangements of me the moon and the earth that agree about all
betweenness and congruence facts but are nonetheless very different geometrically.
17In order for this to work there must be a rich enough variety of field comparisons for us to be able
reconstruct the field values (up to a scale) from the comparisons. This is guaranteed if we make the
assumption, typical in physics, that physical fields are always continuous, so that a field is either constant
everywhere or inhabits an open interval of the space of possible field values.
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The problem Field has identified here seems to be much more general. For example,
Tarski defines the topological notion of two spheres touching (i.e. touching but not overlap-
ping) in terms of the notion of a sphere as follows:
x touches y if and only if, x is disjoint from y, and any two spheres containing x and
disjoint from y are such that one is part of the other.
Neither this definition nor any other will work in a relationist setting. Imagine two worlds
containing two perfectly spherical balls, x and y, in an otherwise empty space. Suppose
also that in the first they are touching, and in the second they are not. Both worlds agree
with one another concerning which things are spheres and which things are parts of what,
but they disagree about which things are touching. Thus, given a relationist ontology, the
touching facts are not fixed by the sphere and parthood facts (in particular, because the
only sphere that contains x is x itself, according to the relationist ontology, x and y count
as ‘touching’ in both worlds by Tarski’s definition).
It follows that in order to pin down the geometrical structure the relationist needs to
introduce twice the distance and touching as new primitives. It is natural to wonder whether
this can be done by adding only finitely many primitives; thus evading the undesirable
aspects of Primitivism. To address this question let us focus on a simple example world
consisting of only three point particles, arranged in some shape. There are an uncountable
infinity of arrangements like this that differ regarding the ratios of the distances between
the three particles.
In this setting the primitivist strategy involves introducing, by brute force, an uncount-
able infinity of primitive ternary relations, so that for each possible arrangement a of the
particles x, y, z there is a fundamental relation Ra that holds between x, y, z (in any order)
iff those particles are in that arrangement.
It is natural to wonder whether we can do better. Can we specify a theory of three point
particles with finitely many primitives without expanding our ontology to include space-time
points or numbers? In order to answer this question we need to state it a bit more precisely.
An arrangement of three particles can be represented by the three particles x, y, z and the
ratios of the distances between any pair of them. Formally the set of possible arrangements
of three particles, A, is the set of metric spaces (M,d) such that M = {x, y, z} quotiented out
by scale.18 Someone hoping to write down a theory capturing the geometry of three point
particles must choose a language L— given by specifying some set of non-logical primitives
— and present a theory which can be either specified axiomatically, or by a class of intended
models, C. For example, in the Hilbert-style theory the primitives of our language are the
congruence and betweenness relations, three constants denoting the three particles, and a
location relation for stating the location of each particle. The class of intended models
consists of three-dimensional Euclidean spaces with the three particles x, y and z located
at three points of that space. Each model of the theory ought to correspond to some
arrangement of the particles: there ought to be a surjective function Arr : C → A. In the
Hilbert-style theory Arr is easy to specify — each model easily determines an arrangement
because the underlying metric of the Euclidean space tells us what the distances between
the three distinguished points are.
The Hilbert-style theory has a nice feature. For any two models M and M ′ in C of the
theory in which the arrangement of x, y and z differ (i.e. Arr(M) 6= Arr(M ′), one can
find a sentence in the language of congruence and betweenness, φ, such that M |= φ and
18That is to say, an arrangement is an equivalence class of such metrics where (M,d) and (M ′, d′) are
equivalent iff d = α.d′ for some α ∈ R.
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M ′ 6|= φ.19 In this way any two arrangements can be distinguished by some sentence of the
language.
The primitivist relationist theory also satisfies this constraint. The language of this
theory has a primitive relation Raxyz for each possible arrangement a ∈ A. The models
of this theory have a minimal relationist ontology: the domain of each model contains only
the three particles x, y, z. Moreover, for any arrangement a ∈ A there’s some model in
which the objects are arranged that way: a model in which Ra applies to x, y and z in any
order, but in which Rb doesn’t apply, in any order, for any b distinct from a. Each model
is therefore associated with a unique arrangement Arr(M) = a where a is the arrangement
such that the extension of Ra is non-empty in M . As with the Hilbert theory, whenever M
and M ′ correspond to different arrangements — i.e. when Arr(M) 6= Arr(M ′) — there is
a sentence that is true in M but not M ′, namely Raxyz where a = Arr(M).
The principle we have appealed to in each case is the following principle. Suppose that
L is a theory with a class of intended models C, that includes models representing each
possible arrangement of the three particles (that is to say, the function Arr associating each
model with an arrangement is surjective). Then if the primitives of L express a physically
complete set of fundamental relations, any two models representing different arrangements
of the particles ought to be distinguishable by some sentence of L:
Distinguishability: If M and M ′ correspond to different arrangements of the par-
ticles (i.e. Arr(M) 6= Arr(M ′)) then there is some closed sentence φ ∈ L such that
M |= φ and M ′ 6|= φ.
This constraint is quite important and is effectively a way of saying, in model theoretic terms,
that the arrangement of the particles supervenes on the facts expressible in L. Without it
one could not formulate an adequate physical theory: the forces particles exert on each other,
for example, depend on the arrangement of those particles. In particular, particles arranged
differently can behave differently. If the fundamental primitives do not distinguish between
two possible arrangements of the particles then the behaviour of the particles will not be
determined by kinds of facts we are taking to be fundamental. Neither the arrangements nor
the motions of the particles will supervene on the distribution of the fundamental properties
and relations; particles could be arranged differently in two worlds even when the two worlds
agree about all the fundamental facts as stated in our fundamental language, L.
We can now prove the following limitative theorem.
Theorem 2.1. Let L be a first or second order language, C a collection of models of L, and
Arr : C → A a surjective association of arrangements to models. Suppose that our class of
models also satisfies the distinguishability constraint. Then one of the following is true:
1. L has infinitely many non-logical primitives.
2. C contains an infinite model.
19Proof: let the distances between x and y in a model M be denoted dM (x, y). If the arrangement of parti-
cles in M and M ′ differ then for some a, b, c, d ∈ {x, y, z} the ratio dM (a, b)/dM (c, d) and dM′ (a, b)/dM′ (c, d)
differ (if all these ratios agreed, they would be in the same arrangement). That means there are a pair of
rational numbers, q and q′ such that q < dM (a, b)/dM (c, d) < q′ but doesn’t hold when M is substituted
for M ′. As we indicated earlier, it is quite easy to express facts about rational distance ratios using a single
sentence.
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This theorem is not particularly deep from a mathematical perspective.20 However it
does clarify the situation: the two most salient responses to the theorem are (i) to adopt
infinitely many primitives, as with Primitivism, or (ii) to adopt an infinite ontology, as with
the substantivalist theory or the theory that postulates mathematical objects to account
for the relations between the three particles. Note, however, that our theorem is quite
general — we have allowed, for example, that which ‘extra’ objects exist can depend on the
arrangement of the particles. Perhaps if the particles are nicely and symmetrically arranged
one can characterize that arrangement with a finite set of primitives without postulating
extra objects. What the theorem shows is that whatever your theory, if it has finitely many
non-logical primitives, there will always be some arrangements for which one needs infinitely
many objects present to distinguish those arrangement from other such arrangements.
Note that one could also question the constraints placed on the kind of language employed
in our theorem: we allowed ourselves first order and second order resources, but one might
think it possible to do better with modal resources. A particularly natural strategy would be
to combine modal resources with second order resources. With a modest finitary principle of
recombination for possible particles, guaranteeing that the outer domain of quantification is
infinite, one could force the domain of the second order quantifiers to range over an infinite
collection of intensions even whilst keeping the inner domain of the first order quantifiers
finite at each world. This could in principle allow one to simulate the kinds things one
would normally do with space-time or mathematical objects, whilst technically keeping our
first-order ontology finite.21 Even if one grants that second order quantification does not in
itself carry a commitment to abstracta (as I am inclined to think myself), such proposals
are not without their own difficulties, although it is beyond the scope of this paper to survey
them in full (but see the discussion in section 2 (on using properties to simulate space-time)
and 9 (on modal approaches) of Field [12]. (See also Mundy [23] and Eddon [10] for property
theoretic account of quantities, and Belot [6] for a fairly sophisticated example of a modal
treatment of geometry.)22
One could respond to these arguments not by introducing relations to space-time points
or numbers, but by introducing some other infinite physical structure that, unlike space-
20If L has a finite signature, then for each finite cardinality n, there are only finitely many different
isomorphism classes of models of L of that cardinality (for an k place relation there are only 2nk possible
relations over a domain of cardinality n, so there are 2n
k1+...+nkm .nl possible models in a language with
l constants and predicates of arity k1, ..., km). It follows that if each model in C is finite then there are at
most countably many isomorphism classes of models ofM. But since there are uncountably many arrange-
ments, Arr must map two models in the same isomorphism class to the same arrangement, contradicting
Distinguishability.
21Here is an example of this kind of strategy, where we employ modal operators and higher order quan-
tification into sentence position: one could adopt a primitive A(x, y, P ) taking two terms and a sentence,
roughly meaning P is an arrangement of x and y: in a possible worlds style model, for some distance d, P
is the set of worlds at which the distance between x and y is d. From this one can define what it means
for P to describe the arrangement of any finite collection of particles, and helping oneself to propositional
quantification and a necessity operator, one can recover the congruence and betweenness relations. Thanks
to Jeremy Goodman for discussion here.
22According to the Mundy-Eddon view, there are infinitely many properties corresponding to each quantity
(e.g. one property for each possible mass) and primitive higher-order relations between these properties that
determine their quantitative structure. It is natural to view the Mundy-Eddon view as falling under the
‘infinite ontology’ branch of our dilemma, as particles are inheriting their quantitative structure by standing
in relations to an infinite collection of mass properties. However, one could also formalize it in third-order
logic with primitive third-order relations over second-order entities, in which case the theory is not within
the remit of our theorem, and the first-order ontology could well be finite (even though the higher-order
domains are infinite).
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time, is invariant under Leibnizian symmetries. Although not relationism as traditionally
conceived, one might hope to find an alternative to space-time from which distances and
other quantities can be recovered without relinquishing No Shifts.
There are, of course, lots of ways of going about this strategy, and the project is too
broad to say anything too conclusive about its prospects. A particularly natural way to go
about this is to take is to take a group of displacements of the universe of material objects
as a primitive physical entity in its own right. According to this theory, particles do not get
locations in this space, but rather pairs of particles get assigned ‘locations’ — i.e. vectors
in our space of parallel displacements — representing the displacement between them.23
Crucially, this ‘location’ remains the same under Leibniz shifts.24
Note however that these projects all involve accepting a form of substantivalism, even
if not the familiar sort. Rather than evaluating the prospects for theories like this — a
worthwhile project for another time — I want to focus on the possibility of carrying out
this sort of idea within the confines of orthodox substantivalism.
3 Multiple Location
These sorts of considerations strike me as a good prima facie reason to be a substantivalist:
by appealing to relations between material objects and space-time points we can recover
enough structure to represent the distances and other quantitative properties and relations,
without placing an undue significance on any particular mathematical representation of
these facts. A relationist, on the other hand, must either take the role of abstracta in
physics more seriously than seems wise or attempt to emulate substantivalism using certain
kinds of higher order and modal resources.
For someone following this line of reasoning, it would not be unreasonable to take these
considerations to also reflect negatively on the No Shifts principle. After all, substantival-
ism is often taken to entail that there are differences between shifted worlds. Note, however,
that the role substantivalism plays in fixing the geometrical structure of material objects is
quite different from the role that regions of space-time play in the shift argument, which
made some specific assumptions about the location relation.
To address the issue of geometric structure one postulates a manifold with its own
intrinsic geometric structure. Geometric relations between material objects then exist only
in a derivative sense: in virtue of material objects standing in some relation — call this the
‘location relation’ — to space-time regions that have the geometric properties in question.
Nothing we have said so far, however, rules out the possibility that the location-like relations
material objects bear to space-time regions are invariant under Leibnizian transformations.
23Note that the order of the pair matters: if v is the displacement between p and q, −v is the displacement
between q and p.
24For simplicity we might focus on a physical structure that is invariant under translations in space —
the group of parallel displacements — however mathematically it straightforward to extend this idea to
rotations using the notion of an angular displacement, and boosts and other continuous symmetries using
other similar notions. A parallel displacement is just a vector quantity that points from point of space-time
to another, telling us the displacement between the two points; this quantity is invariant under translations
in the sense that if one pair of particles is a translation of another the displacement vector between the first
pair is the same as the second pair. The group of parallel displacements of Galilean space-time is itself a four
dimensional manifold, just like Galilean space-time, but it has more structure: it is a normed vector space,
and thus unlike Galilean space, has a special point that is distinguished from the others (the 0 vector). The
manifold is rich enough that the mathematical structure can be recovered in a Hilbert-Tarski-Field style
setting.
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Note that as I have introduced it above, the location relation is defined implicitly by its
role as that relation between objects and space-time from which the geometrical properties of
objects can be recovered. As such, one shouldn’t assume that it corresponds to the prethe-
oretic of notion of location we are used to employing when we are not doing fundamental
metaphysics. The ordinary notion of location usually relates us to places — like Paris, the
moon, and so on — and not regions of space-time.25 With this caveat in mind, we can
ask what it would mean for the world to remain unchanged by a uniform shift of the loca-
tions of each material object. Ignoring time for a moment, and restricting ourselves to a
three-dimensional universe it would require the following:
Shift Invariance: If x is located at y and y′ is a Euclidean transform of y (a
combination of shifts, rotations and reflections) then x is located at y′.
Later we will see that Shift Invariance can be formulated very simply without appeal to
Euclidean transforms (see section 3.4).
Shift Invariance arguably follows from a certain conception of the location relation.
As mentioned above, we are introducing the location relation by the job it plays, regardless
of the distance from our pretheoretic notion. Assuming that an object’s geometric properties
are entirely determined by its shape, the job to be satisfied can be summarized by the idea
that the shape of an object is given by the shape of its location.26 Thus the location relation
must satisfy the constraint that if it holds between a material object O and a region R, then
O has the shape of R. The simplest relation satisfying this constraint is the relation ‘O has
the same shape as R’, and on this interpretation Shift Invariance is true.27 (Of course,
there are also one-one relations that satisfy the job, relating each object to a unique region:
but there are infinitely many of them that are equally good, and if the job description is
our only criteria for choosing, to pick one of them seems arbitrary.)
Of course Shift Invariance requires material objects to be multiply located in a fairly
radical way. The crucial point is that if we are at a world in which objects are multiply
located in this sort of way, then uniformly subjecting every object to a Euclidean transfor-
mation will leave each object with the locations it had before the transformation. Thus we
do get to maintain the principle No Shifts.
This idea generalises to other kinds of transformations. For example, if you thought
that embiggenings don’t generate genuine differences then perhaps a world in which the
displacement between some particular point, p, and the location of each particle had been
doubled (an embiggening around p) also results in a state of affairs no different from the
one you started out with. (In this case, however, it is less clear that the transformation is
a symmetry of the underlying physics.28) In the special theory of relativity, the relevant
transformations are Lorentz transformations. And in the context of general relativity, the
25More importantly, objects are usually thought to be located at no more than one place on this conception.
26More generally, we can read off geometrical relations between more than one object from the shape of
their fusion.
27Note that although one can identify the location relation with the relation of having the same shape, that
needn’t be the order of reduction: in particular, it’s consistent to assume, as we have been, that space-time
has its geometric structure intrinsically and that the shape of a material is given by its location(s).
28In a world in which the distances distances between two point particles of mass m has been doubled,
they will accelerate towards each other at different rates, because the forces between them are inversely
proportional to the square of the distance between them. (Note that talk of ‘doubling the distance between
two points’ must be treated with some care. One can of course change between units in a way that doesn’t
change the physics, but if we keep the scale the same and move each particle so that the distance between
pair of particles is doubled we won’t in general keep the physics the same, unless we also change other
properties like their masses to compensate.)
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transformations that seem natural are diffeomorphisms. In this latter setting the metric
structure of the manifold seems like a contingent and changeable feature of the world, and
thus transformations which preserve the differential structure but not the metric properties
seem like the natural transformations to use. (Although, perhaps surprisingly, this means
that properties like shape are not independent features of an objects location in GR, and
only emerge in the presence of a gravitational field). Thus although classical physics, with
its Galilean symmetry group, has been our focus the fundamental idea can be generalised
to other theories in natural ways.
Shift Invariance is not enough: for all we’ve said, a single fusion of particles could be
located at a table-shaped region of space-time and a chair-shaped region of space-time, so
long as it is located at every region of space-time that has that table or chair shape. To rule
this out we want to require that any two locations of an object are Euclidean transforms of
one another:
Shift Equivalence: If x is located at y and x is located at y′ then there’s a Euclidean
transformation taking y to y′.
Shift Equivalence is required if we are to carry out the project described as Geometric
Reductionism: if the shape of a material object, for example, is determined by the shapes
of its locations, but Shift Equivalence failed, objects simply wouldn’t have well-defined
shapes.29 If we want to satisfy No Shifts and Geometric Reductionism at once, we
had therefore better accept Shift Invariance and Shift Equivalence. (Note, on the
other hand, that we could in principle attempt to take geometric properties as primitive
properties of material objects and regions, and attempt to reduce the location relation to
them: an object is located at a region if and only if they both have the same shape. This
would, of course, would guarantee Shift Invariance and Shift Equivalence, but would
require us to be a geometric primitivist.30)
Finally, it is natural to require that the locations of mereological simples be themselves
mereological simples (space-time points):
Simple Locations: If x is mereologically simple then its locations are too.
This rules out extended simples.
With these three principles in place we are in a position to see, at least in outline, that the
present view is in as good a position as the relationist is. For the relationist the arrangement
of a collection of particles is given by the distances between each pair of particles. Simple
Locations tells us that the locations of a mereological simple are themselves mereologically
simple; they are space-time points. Given a natural principle governing the interaction of
parthood and location, to be discussed in the section 3.3, it follows that the location of the
fusion of two mereological atoms is the fusion of two space-time points. (For convenience
we shall call the fusion of two mereological atoms a ‘diatom’.) By Shift Equivalence
we know that all the locations of a diatom must be congruent to one another, and thus all
consist of a fusion of two space-time points that are the same distance from one another.
Thus the distance between two mereological atoms is always uniquely determined from the
locations of the diatom they fuse, so that all distance facts between point particles (and
thus the geometric properties of their fusions) can be recovered from their relation to the
space-time manifold.
29Note that if we weakened Euclidean transformations to diffeomorphisms, then objects won’t have well-
defined shapes. This is perhaps not unexpected given the consequences of general relativity for the na¨ıve
notion of shape.
30Thanks to [XXX] for discussion here.
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3.1 Locations in Ordinary Language
Now one might wonder how the radical proliferance of locations posited by this kind of
view is consistent with our experiences. After all, if I am looking at the General Sherman
I see a solitary tree. If I were looking at a bilocated tree — a single tree with two exact
locations — one expects to see two tree-like shapes belonging to the same tree. This is
at least how philosophers typically describe paradigm cases involving multiple-location. By
this reasoning, if the tree were multiply located at each of its Euclidean transforms we should
expect to see a tree smeared out over all of space (if that is even possible to visualise), but
this is emphatically not what we see.
One crucial difference between the bilocated tree and the present case is that in the
former the observer is not herself bilocated. Indeed, in the former case the distance between
the observer and the tree is not obviously well-defined: there is the distance between the
observers location and the tree’s first location, and the distance between the observers
location and the tree’s second location. In such a case Shift Equivalence could fail,
since the locations of the fusion of the observer and the tree might not be congruent to one
another if the observer is not symmetrically positioned between the two locations of the tree
(this result can be demonstrated more rigorously in the theory of part and location to be
developed in the next section).
As we have just seen, however, in the present setting in which we have Shift Equiv-
alence the distance between the observers eyes and the tree is completely well-defined: it
simply falls out of a property that the locations of the eye-tree fusion share — roughly, be-
ing a disconnected eye-tree shaped region whose connected parts are separated by a certain
distance. Of course it would be a tall order to give a complete theory of perception in more
fundamental terms, but surely whatever the correct theory is, the position of the tree in
our visual field will depend only on the relative distances between our eyes, the trees and
other background objects and will not depend on which particular regions of space-time the
tree is located at. (One way to convince oneself that there is no conflict with experience,
perhaps, is to appeal to the fact discussed in the last section. The pattern of locations on
this picture determines all the facts about relative distances that the relationist needs. Thus
the present view has the means to account for perceived relative distances if the relationist
does.)
Similar puzzles can be warded off in analogous ways. One might think that it is possible
to uniquely specify the General Sherman’s location simply by gesturing towards a particular
location. I could point at the General Sherman and say something like ‘the General Sherman
is located at that region of space-time over there, and not anywhere else’. But on the present
view I haven’t really succeeded in singling out a unique region of space-time, since my hand
is multiply located the gesture I made is simultaneously related to every region of space-time
with that shape.
All of this admittedly sounds a little wild at first. To put it in perspective, it might
be worth recalling our opening remarks in which we distinguished between two kinds of
motivations for substantivalism. The reasons I have been discussing so far have been rather
theoretical — the simplest way to formulate a physical theory of distances and other phys-
ical quantities without giving particular mathematical objects undue physical significance
appeals to space-time points. However one might have much more direct motivations for
being a substantivalist: perhaps you think that regions of space-time play a more explicit
role in our lives than I have been acknowledging. Perhaps when I wonder where my keys are
I am implicitly wondering which region my keys occupy, for example, or when I learn where
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Jones went on holiday I learn something about a particular region. On this picture facts
about particular regions of space-time can be revealed simply by observing the objects that
occupy those locations, and the theory that best explains our observations is the orthodox
theory in which every object has no more than one location.
I suspect that locations in the everyday sense exist and are indeed the subject of our
ordinary talk of ‘locations’. But I also suspect that locations in this sense aren’t fundamental
entities. Perhaps they are places: ‘my pocket’ and ‘Paris’ both refer to places, and seem like
reasonable answers to the question of where my keys are and where Jones went on holiday,
respectively. Countries and pockets, like other material objects, will be multiply located
in the more fundamental sense. Or perhaps places in the colloquial sense are material
objects, but are ontologically ‘lightweight’ objects like holes and shadows — certain kinds
of non-fundamental entities whose existence supervenes on the properties of other more
fundamental objects. (Holes and shadows, then, are also multiply located in the fundamental
sense.)
Relationists are often perfectly happy to engage in talk of places and locations in the way
understood above. In this way the kind of substantivalist I have been describing can also
accept this sort of non-fundamental talk of locations. But like the relationist, I deny that
this way of talking is a perspicuous description of the fundamental metaphysics. Indeed,
even the ordinary substantivalist should think twice before attempting to identify ordinary
locations, like my pocket and Paris, with regions of space-time, since the former have much
more interesting modal profiles than the latter.31
To a substantivalist motivated by the more direct sort of reasons mentioned above the
view that people are multiply located in this radical manner might seem particularly bad.
But the fact is that the methodology of taking our ordinary use of language at face value is a
notoriously bad way to do fundamental metaphysics. One can see the present view as what
one gets from taking a relationist picture and then expanding the ontology with a richly
structured physical entity that plays the role in a theory of quantities that a mathematical
object would otherwise have played. Counterintuitive results arise when one attempts to
identify that physical entity with the non-fundamental way of talking about places and
locations; but I think this kind of identification is ill-advised in the first place.
3.2 The combined theory of part and location
According to orthodox substantivalism there is a fairly simple way to determine the location
of a complex object. If you know the locations of its parts — in particular, if you know the
locations of all its atomic parts — then the location of the whole is just the fusion of those
parts. In short: the locations of the atoms determine the location of the whole. This is
consistent with the broader Humean thesis that the properties of and relations between point
sized objects determine the properties of and relations between all objects. The fact alluded
to, however, does not come for free — it is delivered by a plausible theory governing the
interaction of parthood and location. One can concoct formal models in which the location
of a whole is not determined by its atomic parts and which thus violate this theory. A pair
of point particles, both located at space-time points, has a fusion that is located at the
fusion of those two points. However it is simple enough to construct formal examples where
the fusion is located elsewhere: on one not so far-fetched model the fusion might be located
at a larger extended region containing the original two points — on this picture ordinary
31Of course some people do make these identifications — see footnote 2 — but they are not completely
pain free (see e.g. Sider [27] §4.8).
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objects like tables and chairs can be located at extended regions (with non-zero volume)
even if they are finite fusions of zero-volume point particles.32 But there are models that
deny any connection between the locations of the atomic parts and the fusion: it’s logically
consistent that the location of the fusion of two particles be any region whatsoever, whether
containing the locations of the individual particles or not. However insofar as these kinds
of situations are deemed pathological they should be ruled out by our theory of part and
location.
The situation for the multiple location theory is not so simple. It seems clear that
whatever kind of theory one adopts connecting parthood and location it cannot be true that
the locations of a complex object are determined by the locations of its atomic parts. To
see this, note that by Shift Invariance, Shift Equivalence, and Simple Locations,
a mereological atom has an exact location at each space-time point and is located only
at space-time points. It follows that any two mereological atoms have exactly the same
locations. Yet a complex object can have much more interesting locations. Consider two
different objects each composed of three atomic parts: one could have locations that are
all equilateral triangles, whereas the other might have locations that are all the shape of
some particular irregular triangle. These two composite objects have different locations, yet
as we have seen their atomic parts have exactly the same locations. In general, knowing
the locations of the particles is not enough to determine the locations of the things they
compose.
Indeed it might at first seem that on this picture one must completely relinquish the
principle that the location of a complex object is determined from the locations of its
smaller parts. As it turns out things aren’t this bad: the location of a whole is determined
by the locations of its diatomic parts (objects with exactly two proper parts) — but in order
to see this we must develop the theory of parthood and location a little more.33
To that end let us begin with the pure theory of location and part: the theory one gets
by looking only at the relation between the parthood and location relations, ignoring any
geometrical constraints such as Shift Equivalence and Shift Invariance. Since, to my
knowledge, no-one has given a thorough analysis of the relation between locations and parts
among multiply located objects we shall need to develop a little bit of theory.
A natural constraint to impose on our theory is that it should have what I’ll call the
classical theory of part and location as a special case: it should entail that theory given the
assumption that every object has a unique location. The classical theory effectively says
that the location relation determines an isomorphism between the parts of a thing and the
parts of its location (this theory is sometimes called ‘mereological harmony’; see Uzquiano
[31] and Saucedo [26]). For simplicity I shall assume the classical extensional mereology. I
shall write x+ y to denote the fusion of x and y and x\y to denote the relative complement
of y from x, which exists whenever x is not a part of y (formally, it is the fusion of x’s parts
disjoint from y).
1. The domain of objects that have locations is closed under fusions and parthood
32The fusion of the locations of the particles composing a table is an extremely disconnected object —
the gaps between the particles is significantly greater than the sizes of the particles — so this intuition holds
even if we do not assume that particles are point sized. On this view the table itself is solid, connected
object merely having a location that contains the fusion of locations of the particles. See Fine [13].
33In addition to the above, there are also quite general problems surrounding the interaction of mereology
and location when multiple location is permitted; see Kleinschmidt [16]. The following is an attempt to
formulate a simple logic of mereology and location that is not subject to these sorts of worries.
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2. The location relation, L, is functional (on the domain of objects that have locations).
We will write l(x), to denote the unique y such that Lxy.
3. l preserves atoms: if a is mereologically atomic then l(a) is mereologically atomic.
4. l preserves relative complements l(x\y) = l(x)\l(y).
5. l preserves fusions: for any x and y, l(x+y) = l(x)+l(y). (More generally, the location
of the fusion of some things is the fusion of the locations of those things.)34
Regarding the theory of parthood as it applies to both material objects and regions, the
classical theory consists of classical extensional mereology. On the intended interpretation
both regions and material objects individually and jointly form a complete Boolean algebra
with the bottom element removed.
The classical theory rules out many of the interesting possibilities that have traditionally
preoccupied philosophers interested in location. (5), for example, says that an object is
located at the sum of its parts locations; thus ruling out the pathological example we
opened with. (1) ensures that fusions and parts of located objects have locations, (2) rules
out the possibility of multiple location, (3) rules out extended simples and (4) effectively
rules out colocation and partial colocation (when mereologically disjoint objects are located
at overlapping regions), and (3), (4) and (5) together rule out unextended complexes.
These principles jointly entail that the location function preserves other important mere-
ological properties: for example that l preserves parthood and disjointness, and that no two
things can have the same location.35
Although many of the possibilities suggested above are worthy of philosophical attention,
our purpose at present is to explore the consequences of multiple location, and the best way
to do this is to screen off these other kinds of non-standard behaviour. Thus the theory we
will consider is the minimal generalisation of the classical theory that allows for multiple
location.
If l is a function that satisfies these conditions we shall call it a location function. The
intended models of the classical theory of location and part are therefore models in which the
location relation is a location function. (More formally the intended models of the classical
theory of location and part consist of a tuple (D,≤, o, l) where (D,≤) is a standard model
of classical extensional mereology, o is an element of D whose improper parts represent
the objects that have locations, and l is a location function whose domain consists of the
improper parts of o and whose range is disjoint from o.) In order to develop the multiple
location theory further, we need to start by specifying the intended models of that theory.
By way of motivating our choice of model, let us start with a simple example. Consider a
simple lego construction consisting of three lego bricks, B1-B3, that have been put together
in a pyramid shape, with two at the bottom and one brick on top holding them together.
Now suppose further that this lego pyramid is bilocated. By examining our intuitions about
34The parenthetical part of (5) is stated using plural quantification. If a first order axiomatisation of this
theory is sought, one should replace this axiom with a schema.saying: if x fuses the φs then xs location is
the fusion of the locations of the φs. Note that without the parenthetical these principles do not entail that
l preserves arbitrary fusions.
35(5) entails that l preserves parthood: if x is a part of y then x+y = y and thus l(x) + l(y) = l(y) by (5),
which means that l(x) is a part of l(y). Without this principle one could be located in one city even when
ones arms, legs, torso and head are located in another. By contrast (4) ensures that l preserves disjointness:
if x is disjoint for y then x\y = x and so l(x)\l(y) = l(x) which means that l(x) is disjoint from l(y). It
also ensures that no two things can have the same location, for if x is distinct from y then either x\y or y\x
exists, but if l(x) = l(y) then neither l(x)\l(y) nor l(y)\l(x) would exist.
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this simple case we shall attempt to tease out some general principles connecting the location
and parthood relations.
To keep our intuitions clean we shall make a few simplifying assumptions. (i) The three
bricks themselves might be composed of smaller parts — indeed assuming they are not
extended simples they must — but for simplicity we shall pretend that these three bricks
and their fusions are the only parts of the pyramid. (ii) We shall assume that the two
locations of the lego pyramid are both congruent to one another (in accordance with Shift
Equivalence). This geometric constraint is not required by the pure theory of part and
location — the different locations of the pyramid could in principle have been any other
shape or size (although it would then become unclear what grounds we have for calling it
a lego pyramid, if some of its locations did not have that shape). (iii) We shall assume
that the bricks B1-B3 that compose the pyramid also have two locations each, and that
these two locations are congruent. (iv) We shall also assume the three bricks are arranged
symmetrically at each location — one could in principle have had B1 be the ‘top’ brick
relative to one location and B2 on top at the other. Again this is completely consistent with
the pure theory of part and location we are exploring in this section. (v) Lastly we shall
assume for simplicity that the two locations of the whole pyramid do not overlap — to make
things vivid we’ll suppose one of the pyramid’s locations is entirely contain within a box,
and the other within a jar.36 Our theory ultimately won’t require this, and of course any
constraint like this will have to be dropped if we are to accommodate Shift Invariance.
The interaction between parthood and location here is relatively clear: there are 7 (i.e.
23 − 1) parts of the pyramid: B1, B2, B3, B1+B2, B2+B3, B1+B3 and B1+B2+B3. Each
of these parts, including the pyramid itself, has two locations — a box location and a
jar location. Insofar as we are generalising the classical theory, then the box location of
B1+B2 should just be the fusion of the box location of B1 and the box location of B2, and
similarly for the other three composite parts of the pyramid. Since we have only finitely
many objects this in effect gets us the classical theory of location and part when we restrict
quantification over locations to locations within the box. None of the deviant behaviour
ruled out by (1)-(5) ought to arise when restricting ourselves to box locations (ignoring,
for the moment, that the bricks are extended simples): thus there ought to be a location
function — a function satisfying (1)-(5) — mapping parts of the pyramid to regions within
the box. Parallel reasoning suggests that there should be a location function mapping the
pyramid and its parts to regions inside the jar. These location functions, of course, are also
defined on material objects disjoint from the pyramid; however assuming there is no other
multiple-location going on, we can assume that the two location functions agree about the
locations of every material object disjoint from the pyramid. An arbitrary object is thus
located at a region iff one (or both) of these two location functions maps the object to that
region: formally this means that the location relation is just the union of these two location
functions (recalling that both functions and relations are sets of ordered pairs).
This example is hopefully instructive enough as to make the following model of a location
relation seem particularly natural
A proper location relation, L, is a union of location functions, where each location
function is a mapping of material objects to regions of space-time satisfying (1)-(5).
36Note if the two locations of the pyramid did overlap, that would be completely consistent with our ban
on colocation. That ban rules out two objects being entirely located at the same region, or entirely located
at overlapping regions: but this is a case where only one object is entirely located at two overlapping regions,
and so is not subject to this ban.
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Thus any location relation, L, can be decomposed into a set of location functions roughly
telling us how objects and their parts are located relative to certain locations. The intended
models therefore consist of all tuples (D,≤, o, L) where (D,≤) is a standard model of classical
extensional mereology, o is an element of D whose improper parts represent the objects that
have locations, and L is a proper location relation whose domain consists of the improper
parts of o and whose range is disjoint from o.
It should be stressed that the decomposition of L into location functions is not unique:
one can have two sets of location functions that have the same union. Here is a very
simple example of this phenomenon. Suppose that two point particles a and b are both
triply located at each of three space-time points, x, y, z, arranged in an equilateral triangle.
Suppose further that the fusion a+b is multiply located at the three locations x+y, y+z, x+z
respectively (note that this stipulation is consistent with the constraint that L be a union
of location functions).
This situation can be represented by three location functions as follows: Here each box
represents how a and b are located in space relative to each location function. Note that it
can also be represented by the following three location functions:
The unions of these two sets of location functions are identical, and locate a and b in
exactly the way we described above.37 It should also be obvious that the union of all six
location functions gives us yet another representation of the same relation. However this
latter representation is special in the sense that it is the largest set of location functions
whose union is L. Thus although there is no unique decomposition of a location relation
into location functions, there is always a unique maximal decomposition: the set of location
functions that are subsets of the location relation. When we talk about the decomposition
of a location relation we shall always mean the maximal decomposition.
This observation suggests that while location functions are a useful way to specify the
structure of the location relation they don’t have any independent reality; indeed in the
next sections we shall look at ways of characterising the location relation directly without
appealing to location functions. It is worth comparing our theory with prima facie similar
responses to the shift argument that place more importance on the role of location functions.
For example, Jeff Russell [25] has recently defended the view that material objects have
unique locations but it is a completely indeterminate or non-factual matter which exact
locations they have. Each ‘precisification’ of the location relation, on this view, is a location
37We also constructed it so that it satisfied Shift Equivalence.
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function, telling us where each object is located according to that precisification. It is
interesting to note that if one were to apply this model to the above example there would
be a genuine difference between a world where it is indeterminate whether the locations of
a, b and a + b are given by the first, second or third location functions, and another world
where it is indeterminate whether the locations of a, b and a+b are given by the fourth, fifth
or sixth (so that the admissible precisifications of ‘located at’ are given by the first three
locations functions in the first world, and the second three in the second world). On the
picture where they’re multiply located, rather than indeterminately located, there would
be no difference between these two possibilities because they determine the same location
relations.
Ultimately these distinctions get washed out in Russell’s theory: he accepts a princi-
ple analogous to Shift Invariance that effectively forces us to choose the maximal set
of precisifications. But this demonstrates that our theory of multiple location is at least
conceptually very different; it does not make the kinds of invisible distinctions that would
have to be acknowledged if we started with a set of admissible location functions instead of
the single location relation that is their union.
3.3 The Theory of Part and Location
Now that we have specified the intended models of the theory, let us turn to axiomatising
it. A major choice-point is whether to pursue a first or second order axiomatisation. In
what follows I shall present both, however there are several substantial technical questions
concerning the first order theories that remain open. I outline these in further detail in the
appendix. These mainly concern completeness (is every sentence true in all intended models
provable in our system), and the status of representation theorems (can every relation that
satisfies the axioms of the theory be expressed as a union of location functions).
The plural language augments first order logic with plural variables, written xx, yy, zz,
and so on, a plural quantifier ∀xx and a singular-plural relation x ≺ xx meaning that ‘x is
one of the xx’. In both the first and second-order cases, the non-logical vocabulary consists
of a binary relation, L, a unary predicate O, and a binary function symbol +. L represents
the location relation, O applies to material objects, and + is a fusion operation. We assume,
for simplicity, that every object is either a material object or a region of space-time so that
regions of space-time can be defined as ¬Ox.
We have chosen to take the binary fusion operator as primitive for convenience, but note
that many of the more familiar mereological relations can easily be defined from it. Parthood
is defined by x ≤ y =df x + y = y, overlap by x ◦ y =df ∃z(z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y), and atomhood
At(x) =df ∀y(y ≤ x→ x = y). We write xx ⊆ yy a short for ∀z(z ≺ xx→ z ≺ yy). Finally,
if x and y overlap, it is also convenient to have a term x u y — the product of x and y —
that denotes the fusion of things that are parts of both x and y, and a term Fus(xx) which,
whenever there is at least one xx, denotes the fusion of the xx.
We may now start laying out the axioms of this theory. We shall start with the plural
version, which results from adding to a standard axiomatisation of plural logic, the following
(self-explanatory) principles:
The axioms of classical mereology (in terms of +).38
38From the first three axioms and our definition of parthood one can prove the reflexivity, transitivity
and anti-symmetry of the parthood relation. (For example, to show anti-symmetry suppose that x ≤ y and
y ≤ x. Thus by definition x+ y = y and y + x = x. But by the second axiom x+ y = y + x so x = y. The
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x+ x = x
x+ y = y + x
x+ (y + z) = (x+ y) + z
∀xx∃x∀y(x ◦ y ↔ ∃z(z ≺ xx ∧ y ◦ z))
All and only material objects are located somewhere.
Ox↔ ∃yLxy
Locations aren’t material objects
Lxy → ¬Oy
Atoms are located at space time points
At(x) ∧ Lxy → At(y).
In the classical theory of part and location, we had an axiom that said that the location
relation preserved fusions: l(x+ y) = l(x) + l(y). Our approach to axiomatising the theory
of part and location will be to produce a suitable analogue of this axiom. However one must
be careful: it is not true, for example, that the locations of x+ y are all possible fusions of
the locations of x and the locations of y. In the case of the lego pyramid, for example, the
fusion of B1’s box location and B2’s jar location is neither wholly located in the box or the
jar, and is thus not a location of B1+B2.
Here is something that is true, however. If the pyramid (the fusion B1 +B2 +B3) is a
located at a region R, then there is a way of cutting R up into three disjoint pieces R1, R2
and R3 such that (i) B1 is located at R1, B2 at R2 and B3 at R3, and (ii) B1 + B2 is
located at R1 +R2, B1 +B3 at R1 +R3, B2 +B3 at R2 +R3 ... and (iii) B1 +B2 +B3
is located at R1 +R2 +R3.
This idea can be generalised in the following way. Suppose that an arbitrary object x is
located at a region y. Then for any way of cutting x up into smaller disjoint pieces, (xi)i∈I
(indexed by some set I), there is a way of cutting up y into a an equal number of little pieces
(yi)i∈I such that whenever J ⊂ I, Fus({xj | j ∈ J}) is located at Fus({yj | j ∈ J}). Thus
by letting J range over singletons, we can see that each part of x, xi say, is located at the
corresponding part of y, yi. Moreover, each fusion of these parts of x (say, xi +xj +xk) are
located at the fusion of the corresponding parts of y, (that is, yi + yj + yk). (And similarly
for infinite collections of these parts.)
This brings us to the final and most important axiom of our theory, which effectively
encodes this thought in plural logic. A partition of an object, x, are some things xx which
are pairwise disjoint (∀xy(x ≺ xx∧y ≺ xx)→ (x◦y → x = y)) but fuse to x (Fus(xx) = x).
A partition xx divides x if and only if x is a fusion of some of the xx. Finally write mat(x)
for the material part of x (i.e. x u Fus(〈x : Ox〉)) and reg(x) for the space-time part of x
(i.e. x u Fus(〈x : ¬Ox〉)).39 The final axioms says:
other principles are similarly straightforward.) Thus every principle of classical mereology is provable given
our definition of parthood (the fusion principle needs no modification). Conversely, the below principles can
be proven in classical mereology if we add the linking principle that x+ y = z iff z is the fusion of x and y:
x+ y = z ↔ ∀u(u ◦ z ↔ (u ◦ x ∨ u ◦ y)).
39Here 〈x : φx〉 is a plural expression for the φs.
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Arbitrary Partitioning Suppose that x is located at y and that the xx are a
partition of the material objects that divides x. Then there are some things, the zz,
that are a partition and that divides x+ y, such that:
(a) If z and w are one of the zz, and mat(z) = mat(w) or reg(z) = reg(w) then
z = w.
(b) If the ww ⊆ zz then mat(Fus(ww)) is located at reg(Fus(ww)).
(c) If z ≺ zz and mat(z) is atomic, reg(z) is atomic.
Our formalisation of the intuitive thought, which uses indexing sets, is a little less direct,
since we are restricted to a plural language. The zz effectively encode a pairing between
the given partition of x and some partition of y, and a little reflection should reveal that
Arbitrary Partitioning correctly captures the thought explained above.
The above plural axiomatisation has an important property: it accurately captures the
intended models of the pure theory of part with multiple-location. Any full model of the
axioms is one in which L can be represented as a union of location functions.40
In order to state a first-order version of this theory we must first replace the mereological
composition axiom above with a schema:
∃zφ→ ∃x∀y(x ◦ y ↔ ∃z(φ ∧ y ◦ z))
We must also find a suitable first-order replacement for Arbitrary Partitioning. The
most straightforward substitute is the following finitary version:
Partitioning: If x is located at y, and x1, ..., xn partition x, then there are y1, ..., yn
such that that each xi is located at yi, each xi+xj is located at yi+yj , each xi+xj+xk
is located at yi + yj + yk (and so on).
Unlike Arbitrary Partitioning, Partitioning is a schema, with a different instance for
each choice of n. That this schema really is expressible in first-order logic is shown in the
appendix.
Here the logical issues are not as clean as with the second-order case. In any model of
the theory in which the extension of O is finite, the extension of L is a union of location
functions. However there are unintended models when the extension of O is infinite. Two
natural questions then present themselves: are there any first order axiomatisations that
rule out unintended models, and are there any first-order axiomatisations that are sound and
complete for the class of intended models (even if such axiomatisations admit unintended
models)? Both these questions are explored further in the appendix.
40A model of a plural language is full if the plural quantifiers range over every subset of the domain.
We show that L is the union of the location functions that are subsets of L (here we use L to denote the
interpretation of the location function in a model). In particular this means showing that if Lxy then some
location function that is a subset of L maps x to y (we show this under the assumption of atomism; a more
intricate argument is needed without the assumption). Suppose that x is located at y and consider the
partition that consists of all the material atoms. Arbitrary partitioning guarantees that there is a bijection
f between these atoms and the atoms of a region of space-time containing y, whose graph is determined by
material and space-time parts of the elements of the partition zz. This bijection will be such that (i) the
fusion of any set of those atoms, X, is located at the fusion of the image of X under f , f(X). If we let l(a)
be the fusion of the image of as atoms under f then l is a location function that is a subset of L. Moreover,
since zz divides x+ y, l maps x to y as required.
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3.4 Combining the Theory with Shift Invariance
We can eliminate reference to the mathematical notion of a Euclidean transformation in our
statements of Shift Invariance and Shift Equivalence, so that our entire theory can
be stated in the internal language of congruence, betweenness, location and part.
In fact the statement of both principles takes a particularly simple form, and turns out
to be a restriction of both principles to diatoms. For example, ‘diatomic shift invariance’
says that if a diatom x is located at p + q (a fusion of two space-time points) then it is
located at every Euclidean transform of p + q. Note however that p′ + q′ is a Euclidean
transform of p+ q iff p and q are congruent to p′ and q′, which is something we can state in
our fundamental vocabulary consisting of congruence and betweenness relations. Diatomic
shift equivalence similarly becomes the claim that if x is located at p+ q and p′ + q′ then p
and q are congruent to p′ and q′. Putting both together we get
Congruent Diatoms: Lx(p + q) → (Lx(p′ + q′) ↔ Cpqp′q′) where p, q, p′ and q′
range over space-time points.
To see that this principle is adequate, we need to know that if the diatoms are located at all
and only the Euclidean shifts of their locations then every object is located at all and only
the Euclidean shifts of their locations. In other words, we need to know that Congruent
Diatoms entails Shift Invariance and Shift Equivalence. In fact this follows from a
fact we mentioned earlier and which we are now in a position to prove: the locations of a
whole are determined by the locations of its diatomic parts (even though, as we saw earlier,
they are not determined by the locations of their atomic parts).
Theorem 3.1 (The Locations of the Diatoms Determines the Locations of Everything).
Let L be a proper location function (a union of location functions), between some domain of
material objects and Euclidean space E3. Suppose that for every diatom there is a pair of
space-time points such that the diatom’s locations are given by the collection of all pairs of
space-time points congruent to that pair. Then for any material object, there is some region
such that the object’s locations are given by the collection of all regions congruent to that
region..
Proof. Suppose that that L is a union of a set of locations functions, F , and that d is some
metric that coheres with the congruence and betweenness structure on E3. We want to
show that if Lxy and Lxz then y is congruent to z: there is some Euclidean transformation
that maps y to z. It is a standard result that y and z are Euclidean transformations of one
another if and only if there is a distance preserving bijection (an ‘isometry’) between the
points in y and the points in z.
From the fact that Lxy and Lxz it follows that there are location functions f, g ∈ F such
that f(x) = y and g(x) = z. I claim that the mapping ι = g ◦ f−1 restricted to points is an
isometry between points in y to points in z. One can see by inspection that it maps y to z.
Suppose that p and q are two points in y and that ι(p) = p′ and ι(q) = q′. Now let a = f−1(p)
and b = f−1(q). It follows that g(a) = p′ and g(b) = q′. Note also that a and b must be
mereological atoms because they are mapped to atoms in E3 by a location function. Thus
a+b is a diatom, and it is located at p+q by f (note that f(a+b) = f(a)+f(b) = p+q) and
located at p′+ q′ by g (since g(a+ b) = g(a) + g(b) = p′+ q′). By Congruent Diatoms it
follows that p+q is congruent to p′+q′, which means that d(p, q) = d(p′, q′) = d(ι(p), f(ι(q))
as required of an isometry.
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A small modification to the argument must be made to extend to the four-dimensional
case: regions are transforms of each other in the relevant sense iff there is an isometry that
also preserves simultaneity and non-simultaneity of each pair of points.
4 Conclusion
We have considered two sorts of theories of the geometry of material objects: theories in
which they inherit their structure by their relation to a space-time manifold which has it’s
geometric structure internally, and theories in which they inherit their structure by their
relation to a platonic realm of abstracta. We have seen that the most straightforward
versions of both these views give rise to certain kinds of objectionable invisible structure.
That does not mean we should reject these approaches, for they may have other theoretical
virtues that could not be achieved otherwise. However I have outlined a theory that can
provide an adequate account of the geometry of physical objects that does without these
invisible differences, and is otherwise quite simple. To be sure, the view does not describe
(nor does it purport to describe) our untutored ideas about the nature of space-time as it
relates to our ordinary talk of locations. But it strikes me that this talk is just a convenient
shorthand for describing facts about the relative locations of different objects (much like the
physicists use of coordinate systems) and should not be taken seriously as a guide to how
things are fundamentally.
5 Appendix A: Fields
Fields, as they are ordinarily conceived, are properties of space-time: a field determines
a field value for each point in space-time, which specifies the strength (and possibly also
direction) of the field at that point. On this view the strength of the field values at a
particle’s location determines the behaviour of that particle. This picture, however, is
fundamentally at odds with the present view, since each particle has many locations, and
so no unique field value can be associated with a particle. This obstacle is not fatal to
the present approach: Newtonian mechanics can be formulated as an ‘action at a distance’
theory — a theory that works directly with the forces acting on each particle by other
particles without invoking fields to mediate these forces. However this approach is not in
the spirit of (if not incompatible with) the idea that forces and other quantities usually
represented by mathematical objects are fundamentally reducible to more basic relations
between concrete entities like space-time points. For example, the action at a distance
theory assigns a number to each ordered pair of particles telling us the force one exerts on
the other. A problem similar to that posed for relationism then arises: unless there are a
continuum of particles between each pair of particles, relations encoding the forces between
the particles alone will be insufficient to specify all the possible kinds of forces a particle can
exert on another. If one could consider the forces exerted at a continuum of points between
the two particles (as one might in some sort of field theory) we could employ the methods
discussed in section 2.2 to eliminate numbers. At any rate, the use of space-time fields are
so pervasive in modern physics it would be remiss not to treat them.
In what follows I’m going focus on strategies, in the spirit of those proposed by Field
[11], for demathematizing scalar and vector fields by reducing them to certain kinds of
congruence and betweenness facts. This strategy comes in two parts, the first of which is
to note that most vector fields of physical interest can be equivalently described by a scalar
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field, so that our problem can in effect be reduced to the problem of giving an account of
scalar fields. The second is to see that a scalar field can be represented, up to an affine
transformation, by a pair of congruence and betweenness relations.
If a vector field is ‘conservative’ — a property most physical fields share — then it can
be represented as the gradient of a scalar field.41 To get a feel for this result it helps to
visualise the special case of a scalar field on two dimensional space: one can picture this
as a kind of hilly terrain imposed over the surface where the height of the field above the
surface represents the magnitude of the scalar field. The slope of the terrain at a point —
the vector pointing downhill with a magnitude proportional to the steepness — will be a
vector field of the requisite kind. This idea easily generalises to higher dimensions. When
a vector field is generated by a scalar field in this way, we call the scalar field a ‘potential’
for the vector field.
It should be noted that many different scalar fields generate the same vector field —
one can uniformly raise or lower the height of a terrain without changing the direction or
magnitude of the slope at each point. For this reason people normally don’t consider the
potential scalar field to be fundamental. When the laws of physics depend only the values of
a vector field, and thus do not discriminate between different scalar fields that generate that
vector field, it is extremely natural to think that the only physically real distinctions are
those that give rise to different assignments of vectors to points. It thus seems prima facie
inadvisable to attempt to reduce vector fields to scalar fields. However our strategy is to
reduce both scalar and vector fields to congruence and betweenness relations, so, for example,
the potential betweenness relation would say ‘the potential at x is between the potential
at y and z’. Interestingly, in this setting the correspondence between vector fields and
the potential congruence and betweenness facts becomes one-to-one. In particular, one can
change the height of a potential without either changing the vector field it generates or the
congruence and betweenness facts it generates. Thus the strategy of reducing conservative
vector fields to facts about potential congruence and betweenness at space-time points seems
like a promising place to start.
However once we adopt Shift Invariance we quickly encounter a completely inde-
pendent difficulty that has nothing to do with the project of demathematizing fields. To
illustrate the problem, consider a single particle with external forces acting on it. We would
normally represent the gravitational potential by a distribution of quantitative properties
over space-time points and determine the particle’s motion by the distribution of these prop-
erties in a neighborhood of the particle’s location. If the particle is multiply located at every
space-time point this method breaks down: the gradient of the potential is different at each
point of space, so we can’t tell anything about the force acting on a particle just by looking
at its locations. It is natural to think that this means that fields have to be multiply located
as well: if a point p has a certain gravitational potential, every Galilean transformation of
p must have that potential as well. But this is not sufficient either, for it would entail that
every field value that’s had anywhere is had by every space-time point at once (since every
space-time point is a Galilean transform of every other space-time point). The locations of
the field has to be somehow correlated with the locations of the material objects for this to
work.42 The following is an exploration of one way of meeting this challenge.
41A vector field is conservative if the ‘work-done’ to get from one point to another does not depend on
the path you take. Most fields that have a chance of representing real physical fields are conservative our
restriction won’t cost us much in the way of generality. Note, though, that an arbitrary vector field on an
n-dimensional manifold can be decomposed into n scalar fields representing its n-components (although this
decomposition is highly non-unique). So if needed, a more general reduction procedure is available.
42Let me note in passing that one way to do this would be to expand our ontology of material objects to
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5.1 Demathematizing fields in orthodox Newtonian physics
We shall start by getting a clearer handle on the representation of forces in the ordinary
substantivalist setting, in which each particle has a single location. Let us begin by con-
sidering a very simplified example consisting of two point particles, a and b, constrained to
one dimension with no external forces acting on them. Both a and b generate a force field
defined over space: the value of the field generated by a at the location of b determines how
quickly and in what direction b will accelerate. Such forces can be equivalently represented
by a scalar potential (the potential energy): in this case it will be the values of the potential
in a neighborhood of a and of b that will determine their respective motions.43 Now we
can imagine what would happen if we were to uniformly translate the positions of the two
particles in some direction by some fixed amount without also shifting the fields. The result
would not be legal: each force fields has a source — a point from which the field emanates
— and these sources would not match the locations of the particles. In particular the force
acting on a and b respectively would depend on their distances from the sources, and not on
the distance from each other as it ought to. In order to preserve the laws we must translate
a, b and the gravitational field as well. Similarly, when the two particles move in a lawlike
manner, we must also provide laws telling us how the field values change, so that the field
sources ‘keep up’ with the particles.
A metaphysically distinct (although mathematically equivalent) way to represent our two
particle example is to imagine the system having a single location in a higher-dimensional
space called configuration space, where each point in configuration space represents all the
particles locations in ordinary space. Recall that both particles in our example reside in a
1-dimensional space, and there are only two of them, so in this case configuration space is
2 dimensional. (More generally, when we are considering all three dimensions, and there
are N particles, configuration space will have 3N dimensions.) The gravitational forces can
similarly be represented by a vector field on this 2-dimensional space, with the first compo-
nent of the vector at a point representing the force a exerts on b and the second component
representing the force b exerts on a when a and b are located according to that point in
configuration space. As before, this vector field can be equivalently represented by a scalar
potential. A uniform shift of the locations of a and b in configuration space corresponds
to moving the location of the system diagonally in configuration space (north east or south
west, as it were). Unlike in the previous example, we do not also need to shift the field, since
the value of the gravitational field on configuration space is constant along all diagonal lines
of this sort. The forces between two particles depends only on the relative distances between
the particles, so the field values on configuration space must be constant along all paths in
configuration space that leave the relative distances between particles fixed.44 (Although
include fields as well, consisting of point sized parts. Field values can then be construed not as properties
of space-time points, but as properties of the point-like parts of the field. Thus the field values are multiply
located in a way that correlates with locations of the field itself, and any other material objects we might
want to include. This strategy is not without contention, however. Since each material object has a unique
‘location’ within a given field, this maneuver potentially reinstates the problems we originally had with
space-time. For example, Arntzenius [2] points out (in the context of a discussion of relationism) that you
can shift the field values at each point of a field to some other point on the field in a uniform fashion, in a
way completely analogous to a Leibniz shift on space-time.
43Sometimes it is natural to consider a single vector field defined over space — the gravitational field
— telling us the force per unit mass that would be exerted at each point of space-time due to every other
particle. I have chosen to illustrate things with two distinct fields, rather than merging them into one,
because it makes for a more straightforward comparison with views consider later.
44In more detail, the value of the force at (x, y) — the point where a is at x and b at y — is (−Gmamb/(x−
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we are presently focusing on Newtonian mechanics in the ordinary setting, one can already
see how this second way of thinking might be more friendly to the multi-locational view I
am endorsing.)
These two examples suggest two possible ontologies one might adopt. According to the
first ontology one has two particles whose fundamental properties include their positions and
masses, and two vector force fields (or equivalently, scalar potentials) whose fundamental
properties include its strength at each point in ordinary space. To specify the dynamical
evolution of this system we need two kinds of laws. One of the laws will tell us how the
positions of the particles change over time — these laws tell us how positions change in
terms of the strength of the field at (or at a neighborhood) of those positions. Another kind
of law is needed to specify how the fields change their field values over time — these laws tell
us how the field values change in terms of the positions of the particles. Conceptually this
seems a little unsatisfactory, since there is an obvious circularity, and it’s a mathematically
non-trivial fact that the circularity is not vicious. This picture also seems to be unnecessarily
complex: we have to provide both laws telling us how the positions of the particles evolve
(depending on the strength of the field) and laws telling us how the gravitational field evolves
(depending on the positions of the particles). This might seem especially unsatisfactory if
one thought that the existence of fields were only postulated to explain the motions of
particles; on the present picture also needs to explain the motions of the fields, and to do
so one invokes the motions of the particles.
According to the second ontology we have particles as before, except now the thing
playing the role of the two force fields (or potentials) is a single field over configuration
space. In this setting the force field on configuration space remains constant over time, and
the only thing that changes is the systems position in configuration space. Thus in this
setting we only need laws telling us how the position of the particles change in configuration
space in terms of a constant field.
Let us develop the second idea a little more. In the general setting with N particles and
three spatial dimensions, the field can be represented by a scalar potential field U on a 3N
dimensional configuration space, and the system gets assigned a position in that space. To
get an intuitive handle on U , suppose that a’s position is described by the ith argument of U ,
and imagine that somehow the positions of every particle except for a has been frozen in place
in positions p1..., pi−1, pi+1...pN . We can then imagine the forces that would be exerted on a
if a was located at each point p: these forces can be represented by the potential at each point
in space. This is a function of p, Ui, that is given exactly by our N place function with N−1
of its degrees of freedom removed by filling them with the parameters p1..., pi−1, pi+1...pN
(that is, Ui(p) = U(p1..., pi−1, p, pi+1...pN )).45 We shall simplify this idea in three stages:
we shall firstly show how to do without configuration space substantivalism, then we’ll show
how to rid our primitives of haecceitistic involvement of particular particles, and finally
we’ll show how to understand these fields without fundamentally involving numbers in our
description.
The first thing to note about this picture is that it seems to commit us to configuration
space substantivalism: the view that configuration space is just as real and concrete as
ordinary space, or perhaps that it should replace ordinary space . This is not in itself
a problem, and some have suggested configuration space substantivalism for independent
y)2, Gmbma/(x− y)2). It is the same value at (x+ c, y + c) since ((x+ c)− (y + c))2 = (x− y)2.
45Note, of course, that to determine the motion of a, one only needs to know the field values in a
neighbourhood of a. U specifies those values everywhere, which is important, for example, when we are
looking at the Lagrangian formulations of Newtonian mechanics.
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reasons (see Albert [1]). However it is natural to figure out to what extent this picture
commits us to configuration space substantivalism, and how far we can get without reifying
configuration space. It turns out that it isn’t that hard to do without it provided we are
ordinary substantivalists about space-time. To get a quantity defined over ordinary space
that will do the job, all one needs is a quantity that requires many arguments to determine
its value, N spatial points to be precise, rather than a single point of configuration space.
Formally this is a real function U(p1, ..., pN ) taking N space-time points and returning a
scalar quantity. For conceptual clarity, it’s important not to confuse an N -place function
with a 1-place function taking a single argument with N components to a real number (i.e.
a scalar field on configuration space) — even though they are mathematically isomorphic,
the latter formalism assumes a richer ontology of points of configuration space.
The second thing to note is that the potential field U is not a perspicuous way to represent
reality since its values depend covertly, and in a non-perspicuous way, on the properties of
three particular particles.46 For example, in a system with three particles, a, b and c, the
potential is completely described by all the facts of the form U(p1, p2, p3) = α, stating that
when a is at p1, b at p2 and c at p3, the potential is α. Clearly the value of U(p1, p2, p3)
depends on the masses of a, b and c: as we vary the masses of a, b and c through modal
space this value changes, whereas if we were to vary the masses of three distinct particles
the value wouldn’t change. Thus two qualitatively identical worlds could differ over the
value of U(p1, p2, p3) if a, b and c existed and exerted forces in one world, and didn’t exist
(and thus didn’t exert forces) in the other.47
It is somewhat strange to think that the fundamental laws governing our example above
are essentially specific to the motions and forces generated by the particular particles a, b and
c, and not about how three particles in general would interact with one another. It should
also strike us as unsatisfactory that in order to say what the potential is when three different
particles with the same masses are located at p1−p3 one must introduce a new fundamental
primitive. These issues can easily be resolved if we adopt a more general relation as our
fundamental primitive, that takes both particles and space-time points as arguments, and
tells you what the potential is when those particles are located at those positions. In the
three particle case, for example, we’d employ a six place function U(a, p1, b, p2, c, p3) = α
which tells us what the potential is when a is at p1, b at p2 and c is at p3. Thus the three
place function we were working with above is just the result of substituting three particular
particles as arguments into our more fundamental function.
The third and final modification we need to make is to eliminate reference to numbers in
our formulation of the potential. Following Field [11] we achieve this by means of congru-
46A related point is made by Bradley Monton about configuration space realism in the context of quantum
mechanics. See [22].
47In a world where a, b and c do not exist, U(p1, p2, p3) is 0, as we have introduced it, since a, b and c do
not exert any forces. One might try to come up with a different way of interpreting U so that its values
somehow depend on whichever three particles happen to exist (assuming there are only three), but the
hopes for that project seem dim. Consider the set of worlds, X, in which only the particles a, b and c exist
in different possible arrangements. Now imagine two sets of worlds, X[a/d] and X[a/d′], whose worlds are
qualitatively identical to the worlds in X in which particles d and d′ respectively have been substituted for a
in each world in such a way that they play the some qualitative role as a (and assume b and c remain in their
qualitative roles). We would presumably want the first argument of U to track the mass of d throughout
X[a/d] and d′ throughout X[a/d′]. By completely symmetrical reasoning, if we were to substitute b in
each world in X[a/d] with d′ we’d expect the second argument of U to track the mass of d′ throughout
throughout the resulting space of worlds, X[a/d][b/d′]. Similarly if we were to substitute b with d in each
world in X[a/d′], we’d expect the second argument of U to track the mass of d in X[a/d′][b/d]. However
this is impossible because X[a/d′][b/d] = X[a/d][b/d′] (since for every world in X there’s a qualitatively
identical world in X in which a and b have switched roles).
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ence and betweenness relations. For example, assuming configuration space substantivalism
we could adopt a four-place congruence relation CU (x, y, z, w) and three-place betweenness
relation BU (x, y, z) on configuration space. The former tells us when the difference in po-
tential between two points in configuration space is the same as between two other points,
and the latter tells us when its value at a point is between the values at two other points
respectively. As we noted above, we can reformulate this theory in a way that doesn’t as-
sume configuration space substantivalism, by introducing relations over ordinary points of
space with more arguments. Thus congruence becomes a 4N -place relation CU (x¯, y¯, z¯, w¯)
and betweenness a 3N place relation, BU (x¯, y¯, z¯) where each barred variable is short for
a sequence N independent variables standing for space-time points, rather than a single
variable standing for a point in configuration space. The large number of arguments should
not come as a surprise: if we are not assuming configuration space substantivalism, even our
potential function U has to have a large number of argument places.48 Finally, we noted
that gravitational potential is most perspicuously represented by including the particles as
arguments as well; U(a1, p1, ..., aN , pN ). This function can be captured using betweenness
and congruence relations in the usual way, although now we double the number of argu-
ments.49 General laws — sentences in which all the arguments of primitive predicates are
occupied by bound variables — stated in this language will state qualitative facts.
5.2 Fields and the theory of multiple location
The framework we have just described is at least a gesture at what I take to be the most
promising assortment of fundamental relations that can recover the fields of Newtonian
physics without postulating fundamental relations between the physical and the abstract.
What is particularly interesting, however, is that this formalism extends without any mod-
ification to the setting of interest to us, in which every object is located at every Galilean
transform of its locations.
To get an intuitive feel for this, note that the fundamental relations we have outlined
above determine (via a potential) the forces acting at each point in configuration space. For
Newtonian systems the potential on configuration space has the following form:
U =
∑
i<j Uij(|xi − xj |) =
∑
i<j Gmimj/|xi − xj |
her i and j range over numbers less than the dimension of the configuration space (three
times the number of particles), x3k, x3k+1, x3k+2 describe the three components of the loca-
tion of the kth particle, m3k = m3k+1 = m3k+2 is the mass of the kth particle, and G the
universal gravitational constant.
The components of the slope of this field, recall, determines a force field on configuration
space that states what the forces acting on each particle would be if the particles were
configured according to that point. Recall also that space-time symmetries of the particles,
such as translations and rotations, correspond to symmetries of this field in configuration
space. In our example with two particles constrained to a single dimension, configuration
space was two dimensional and the potential U at each point is, given our equation above,
proportional to 1 over the distance of that point from the line y = x (turning infinite at
y = x, corresponding to the collision of the particles). The level sets of U (the set of points
48The large number of arguments is a feature that was introduced when we rejected configuration space
realism; it is not the use of congruence and betweenness relations themselves that are responsible for this.
49If you’re keeping track, congruence now has 8N arguments and betweenness 6N , where N is the number
of particles.
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at which U has a constant value) thus consist of pairs of parallel lines that are reflections
of each other about the diagonal line y = x. A translation of both particles in space would
correspond to a diagonal shift in configuration space along a level set of U , and a reflection
in space would take me from one diagonal line to the diagonal line on the other side of
and of equal distance from the line y = x. (Note that there are no rotations for particles
constrained to one dimension. When configuration space is higher dimensional the level sets
of U tend to have a much more interesting structure). The trajectory two systems trace out
in configuration will have the same shape if they start out with the same velocity and at
points in configuration space belonging to the same level set.
A multi-particle system, consisting of singly located particles at various space-time
points, corresponds to a single point of configuration space: the ‘systems location in config-
uration space’. According to our version of substantivalism, a physical system is multiply
located at all of its Euclidean transforms. In configuration space this means the system is
multiply located at every point in a given level set of U . We can now see how our original
problem for space-time fields is avoided by moving to fields over configuration space. Given
an ordinary field on space-time we cannot uniquely associate a field value to a multiply
located particle: the value of the space-time field can be different at different locations.
However note that a system that’s multiply located in accordance with Shift Equiva-
lence is only located at points of configuration space where the value of U is the same.
Thus by working with fields on configuration space — or at any rate, working with many
place relations on space-time that determine such a field on configuration space — we no
longer find ourselves associating multiple field values to the same particle.
6 Appendix B: the first-order theory of part and loca-
tion
In this appendix we explore further some of the issues relating to a first-order axiomatisation
of the pure theory of location and part. That theory relies on two definitions:
Definition: Say that the sequence x1, . . . , xn is located (or 0-strongly located) at the
sequence y1, . . . , yn, written L
nx1 . . . xny1 . . . yn, iff the fusion of any elements of the
former sequence is located at the fusion of the corresponding elements of the latter
sequence.
Definition: A sequence x1, . . . , xn of material objects is a partition if its elements are
pairwise disjoint but their fusion is the fusion of all material objects. A subpartition
of length m > n of x1...xn is a partition y1...ym, such that every xi is a fusion of a
subsequence of y1...ym.
Note that for a fixed n these definitions can be formulated in first order logic. In the former
case, for example, it would involve a long conjunction with a conjunct for all the possible
subsequences of 1, . . . , n.50
With these definitions at hand we can state a finitary version of Arbitrary Parti-
tioning in first order logic (the thesis is schematic, for each choice of n):
50The first definition is given by the formula:
Lnx1 . . . xny1 . . . yn :=
∧
{i1...ik}⊆{1...n}
Lxi1 + . . .+ xikyi1 + . . .+ yik
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Partitioning: If x is located at y, then there is some y′ disjoint from y such any
n-length subpartition of x, xc is located at some n-length subpartition of y, y′.
Here xc denotes the complement of x in the material objects: the fusion of material objects
disjoint from x. Roughly what the axiom says is that if x is located at y, and we cut up
x and x’s complement into lots of little bits, we can find a way of cutting up y and y’s
complement (relative to some region) in such a way that not only are each of the former
bits located at the latter bits, but fusions of the former bits are located at corresponding
fusions of the latter bits.
If we add to the above axioms the principle that every object has a unique location we
can recover the classical theory of location and part. In particular, we can show that the
location function preserves fusions and relative complements.51
However unfortunately the above axioms (along with the other first-order axioms of
section 3.3) are not enough to pin down the structure of the location relation. There are
relations that satisfy the axioms but are not unions of location functions. Part of the issue
here is that this isn’t even possible in the first-order versions of the classical theory of
location and part: those axioms require that location functions preserve arbitrary fusions,
which is not something you can state in a first order language.52 There are, however, a
couple of further questions that bear investigation:
Question 1: Say that a function from a domain of material objects to a domain of
regions is a weak location function if it preserves atomhood, relative complements and
finitary fusions. Is it true that every relation satisfying our axioms is a union of weak
location functions?
Question 2: Is our axiomatisation complete? Are there any principles that are true
in all the intended models that are not provable from our system? (Here we may
consider the class of all the models in which L is a union of location functions, or the
class of models where L is a union of weak location functions, as our intended models.)
Although both of these questions are open, there is a sequence of principles that at least
prima facie seem to strengthen Partitioning; if they are indeed stronger then the answer
to the second question is negative. These principles require another definition:
Definition: A partition x1, . . . , xn is k + 1-strongly located at y1, . . . , yn if and only
if for every m-length subpartition of x1, . . . , xn is k-strongly located at some m-length
subpartition of y1, . . . , yn.
51To see this note that x u y, x\y, y\x (assuming they all exist (if they don’t all exist, the following
argument will simplify) is a partition of x + y, which by Partitioning means that there is a partition of
x + ys location, r, s, t, such that the sequence x u y, x\y, y\x is located at r, s, t. This means in particular
that x = x u y + x\y is located at r + s, and y = x u y + y\x is located at r + t, that x \ y is located
at s = (r + s)\(r + t), which is l(x) \ l(y), so that our location function preserves relative complements.
Similarly, since x is located at r+ s, y at r+ t, and x+ y at r+ s+ t we see that the location of x+ y is just
the fusion of the location of x with the location of y, demonstrating that our location function preserves
fusions. Thus we can see that the above theory is a generalisation of the classical theory of location and
part.
52Let our domain of material objects be N. Let X be the quotient Boolean algebra P (N)/ ≈, where A ≈ B
iff |A\B∪B\A| is finite. For A in P (N), let [A] be the member of X containing A. By Stone’s representation
theorem X is isomorphic to some algebra of subsets of Y (disjoint from N), by some isomorphism f . Let the
set of points of space be N∪Y . The location function l(A) = A∪ f([A]) satisfies all of the axioms above but
does not preserve arbitrary fusions since l({n}) = {n} for each n but l(N) = N ∪ f([N]). Thanks to [REF]
for suggesting this construction.
33
Here, of course, our definition is encoded in a different first-order formula for choices of k,
m and n, where m > n. As m and n increase the number of conjunctions in the first order
definitions of ‘located’, ‘partition’ and ‘subpartition’ increase, and as k increases the number
of alterations of the quantifiers increases as well. The case k = 0 is given by our original
notion of location for sequences. We can thus strengthen Partitioning to:
k-Partitioning: If x is located at y, then for some y′ disjoint from y, x, xc is k-
strongly located at y, y′.
Once again, if these principles are not provable from our initial system, it is natural to ask
questions analogous to the two questions above about a strengthened system containing
these principles.
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